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Autocratic incumbents often attempt to co-opt select opposition party leaders to
minimize threats to their rule. While the literature identifies co-optation of opposition
party leaders as an important survival strategy of autocrats in electoral autocracies, we
lack a systematic examination of why some opposition party leaders are co-opted but not
others. This article argues that opposition party co-optation is shaped by both inter-
and intra-party dynamics. Using a novel data set on opposition party organizations in
electoral autocracies between 1970 and 2019, I show that opposition parties with high
mobilizational capacity and those that devolve internal decision-making authority from
the party leadership to lower cadres are less likely to be co-opted, especially when they
are ideological distant from autocratic incumbents. I contend that opposition parties’
organizational characteristics and their ideological positioning in an autocratic party
system significantly alter the strategic calculus of the incumbent regime and opposition
party elites in deciding whether or not to cooperate with one another. Hence, autocratic
incumbents’ ability to control opposition parties through co-optation is shaped not
only by the commonly highlighted factors such as resource availability, institutional
manipulation or repression, but also as a result of the relatively less well-understood
factors such as opposition party organizational features and party positions.
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1 Introduction
In electoral autocracies where opposition parties are allowed to compete for the national
executive and the legislature, autocrats frequently seek to elicit the cooperation of select
opposition party leaders to mitigate threats to their rule (Arriola, 2009; Arriola, DeVaro, &
Meng, 2021; Buckles, 2019; Gel’man, 2005; Kelly, 2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Lust-Okar,
2005; Reuter & Robertson, 2015). They typically do so by providing opposition party leaders
with access to patronage resources and making limited policy concessions. In return for these
benefits, opposition party leaders are expected to refrain from genuinely challenging the
regime. In countries such as Venezuela, Turkey and Russia, autocratic incumbents managed
to entrench their rule despite unfavorable circumstances, in part because they succeeded
in ensuring the support of select opposition party leaders.1 Research suggests that when
autocrats manage to co-opt opposition parties, they are better able to prevent anti-regime
collective action and survive in office (Arriola, 2009; Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Przeworski,
2007; Lust-Okar, 2005; Reuter & Robertson, 2015).
Despite the importance of opposition party co-optation in autocracies, our understanding
of why some opposition parties are co-opted but not others remains limited. Most studies
treat co-optation mainly as an independent variable to understand its implications for opposi-
tion fragmentation (Arriola et al., 2021), the nature of dictatorial concessions to opposition
groups (Conrad, 2011), mass protest (Lust-Okar, 2005; Reuter & Robertson, 2015), and
regime survival (Arriola, 2009; Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007). Studies focusing
on the drivers of co-optation are primarily concerned with explaining the incentives and
capabilities of autocratic incumbents to co-opt opposition elites (Arriola, 2009; Arriola et
al., 2021; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006). However, with the exception of a few recent studies
based on a small number of cases limited to a single region (e.g. Buckles, 2019; Gandhi &
Buckles, 2016; Kelly, 2018), little has been done to explain which opposition parties are more
likely to be co-opted by autocratic incumbents.
In this article, I highlight how internal features of opposition parties interact with the pat-
terns of inter-party competition in shaping the incentives and capabilities of both autocratic
1Examples of co-opted parties include Just Russia (Russia), Nationalist Action Party (Turkey), Father-
land for All (Venezuela).
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incumbents and opposition party leaders to strike co-optation deals. I demonstrate that
organizationally extensive opposition parties that are characterized by a nationwide network
of permanent local branches together with entrenched ties to prominent social organizations,
and those that distribute internal decision-making authority among various party members,
are less prone to co-optation. Such organizational features reduce opposition party leaders’
incentives to seek political power through co-optation by lowering the costs of maintaining
their oppositional stance against the regime, while constraining their ability to bargain with
autocratic incumbents. I further argue that ideological distance between an opposition party
and autocratic incumbents amplifies the effect of organizational features as it increases the
costs of building an alliance on the part of both sides.
Empirically, this article provides the first party-level quantitative analysis on the link
between opposition party organizational features, ideological positions, and elite co-optation
in electoral autocracies. Using novel party-level data from Varieties of Party Identity and
Organization Dataset (V-Party) (Lührmann et al., 2020b) on organizational characteristics
and party positions of 328 opposition parties in 64 electoral autocracies between 1970 and
2019, I find empirical evidence corroborating the argument. There is strong evidence that
organizationally extensiveness opposition parties, and those with dispersed decision-making
structures are less prone to co-optation. Furthermore, there is evidence of interaction effect
between party organizational features and ideological distance between opposition parties
and autocratic incumbents. The negative effect of organizational extensiveness and the
dispersion of internal decision-making authority on the likelihood of co-optation is higher
when ideological distance between an opposition party and autocratic incumbents increases.
Conversely, party organizational extensiveness and the dispersion of internal decision-making
authority exacerbate the negative effect of ideological distance on the probability that an
opposition party will be co-opted. The results demonstrate the importance of considering
both internal party features and party positions to fully understand how opposition party
co-optation works in electoral autocracies.
The key implication of this article is that opposition parties are not simply at the mercy
of autocratic institutions and strategic considerations of incumbents; rather they are organi-
zations with varying incentives and qualities that shape their strategies to navigate through
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autocratic constraints. The study’s findings call for a greater attention to the mechanisms
by which opposition party institutions influence the dynamics of autocratic rule. Previous
research overwhelmingly focuses on regime institutions to understand the incentives and ca-
pabilities of autocratic incumbents to control political opposition through co-optation. This
study shows that how opposition elites are organized is also critical for understanding the
conditions under which autocrats are likely to fail (succeed) in their attempts to control
opponents through co-optation, contributing to a nascent but growing body of research on
opposition parties (e.g. Buckles, 2019; Greene, 2007; Kelly, 2018; LeBas, 2014). Incorpo-
rating opposition party organizations to the comparative study of political institutions in
autocratic settings can provide an important analytical leverage for the broader research
agenda seeking to explain why nominally democratic institutions such as multiparty elec-
tions that are intended to perpetuate autocratic rule sometimes sow the seeds of regime
change (Bernhard, Edgell, & Lindberg, 2020; Bunce & Wolchik, 2011; Schedler, 2013).
2 Opposition Party Co-optation in Electoral Autocra-
cies
Electoral autocracy has become the modal form of dictatorship in the contemporary world
(Schedler, 2006). These regimes hold regular multiparty elections for the chief executive
and national assembly, and opposition parties are allowed to recruit candidates, open offices,
and run campaigns. Yet, incumbents employ various strategies to skew the playing field in
their own favor (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013). Under electoral authoritarianism,
incumbents often stack electoral commissions and courts with supporters, limit political op-
position’s access to media, divert public funds for partisan use, and occasionally resort to
electoral fraud. Where such institutional manipulations fall short of controlling the oppo-
sition, incumbents may employ overt repression. While these strategies can put opposition
parties at a significant disadvantage, they can erode the regime legitimacy both domestically
and internationally (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011; Schedler, 2009). Consequently, incumbents
often back up institutional manipulations and repression with attempts to elicit cooperation
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of select opposition party leaders to maintain their control over electoral arena and con-
solidate their rule (Arriola, 2009; Arriola et al., 2021; Buckles, 2019; Gel’man, 2005; Kelly,
2018; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Lust-Okar, 2005; Reuter & Robertson, 2015). The key is that
co-optation can replace the costly use of flagrant repression and other forms of manipulation.
I define co-optation as an intentional extension of benefits to opposition elites by au-
tocratic incumbents in exchange for their loyalty, acquiescence or cooperation. Autocrats
co-opt opposition party leaders by providing them with access to patronage resources, ap-
pointing them to key political positions, and/or by making limited policy concessions. In
return, opposition leaders are expected to cooperate with the incumbents by supporting their
policy initiatives, and by refraining from engaging in anti-regime collective action. Exam-
ples of opposition party co-optation include Just Russia (SR) that supported the Russian
President Medvedev’s policy initiatives during the 2007-2011 parliamentary term; or the
National Union for Democracy and Progress’s (UNDP) leader Bello Bouba’s appointment
to the cabinet in 1997 by the Cameroonian President Biya. Although previous research sug-
gests that co-optation of opposition parties is critical for regime survival (e.g. Arriola, 2009;
Gandhi, 2008; Lust-Okar, 2005), our understanding of why autocratic incumbents co-opt
some opposition parties but not others remains limited.
One strand of research focuses on the incentives and capabilities of autocrats to co-opt
political opposition. The conventional wisdom holds that autocrats have greater incentives
to resort to co-optation when opposition is capable of threatening regime stability (Gandhi
& Przeworski, 2006). Research suggests that autocratic incumbents often seek to co-opt
opposition parties that have demonstrated ability to form an anti-incumbent electoral coali-
tions with other opposition parties (Gandhi & Buckles, 2016). Evidence also indicates that
autocratic incumbents are more likely to resort to co-optation when their vote share declines
(Arriola et al., 2021).
While the threat posed by opposition parties creates incentives for co-optation, the lit-
erature also highlights several political and economic constraints limiting the incumbents’
capacity of co-optation. Arriola (2009) shows that regimes placing few constraints on the
executive, and the availability of economic resources for patronage distribution enhance au-
tocratic incumbents’ ability to co-opt opposition elites by appointing them to the cabinet. In
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a recent study, Arriola et al. (2021) further demonstrate that ruling party institutionalization
limits the incumbents’ flexibility of co-opting opposition elites by enabling regime members
to veto co-optation deals that would require them to share rents and spoils with opposition
elites.
These works make important contributions, but as some studies increasingly recognize it
is also important to consider the conditions under which opposition party elites are willing to
accept co-optation offers by autocratic incumbents. Kelly (2018) highlights the importance
of having financial endowments and reputation for an opposition party leader to resist co-
optation and maintain its oppositional stance over time. Focusing on party organizational
characteristics, Buckles (2019) develops a game-theoretic model demonstrating that having
a large activist base discourages opposition leaders from cooperating with incumbents given
the party activists’ incentives to replace the co-opted leader with an alternative leader.
I contribute to this literature by focusing on additional opposition party organizational
attributes, and by discussing how inter- and intra-party factors drive patterns of co-optation.
In particular, I build on Buckles’s (2019) argument that opposition party leaders’ incentives
to accept a co-optation offer depends on party organizational characteristics. But I discuss
how other party organizational attributes such as network of local branches, ties to social
organizations, and the dispersion of decision-making authority within opposition parties
affect the incentives and abilities of opposition party leaders and autocratic incumbents to
forge co-optation agreements. Furthermore, I also theorize about how party organizational
features interact with ideological proximity of opposition parties to autocratic incumbents
in affecting which opposition parties are more likely to be co-opted. Finally, I present the
first party-level quantitative examination of the relationship between time-varying internal
characteristics of opposition parties, their ideological orientations, and co-optation events.
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3 Party Organizations, Ideological Proximity, and Co-
optation
3.1 Potential Benefits and Risks of Co-optation for Autocrats and
Opposition Elites
Autocrats strive to balance the benefits of co-opting an opposition party against the costs.
On the positive side, co-optation can help autocrats avoid the costly use of blatant repres-
sion and institutional manipulation. Autocrats can manipulate institutions and use coercion
to secure power, but the more they employ such strategies, the greater the risk of opposi-
tion backlash (Schedler, 2009). Yet with too little coercion and manipulation they can be
overthrown. Co-optation can solve the dilemma by expanding the regime’s support base
and preventing anti-regime collective action, which together diminish the need for overt re-
pression and manipulation. By selectively targeting some opposition parties while excluding
others, autocrats can exacerbate coordination problems within the opposition (Arriola et al.,
2021; Lust-Okar, 2005). Thus, autocrats can ultimately neutralize potential threats to their
rule and prolong their tenure in office by co-opting opposition parties.
However, on the negative side, co-optation often involves policy concessions and the
distribution of patronage resources to opposition elites. Channeling such benefits to political
opposition often comes at the expense of a larger distribution of spoils among the members
of the ruling coalition whose support is critical for the incumbent leader (see, for example,
Bueno De Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2005). When autocrats decide to co-
opt opposition elites, they risk alienating regime elites, especially the hardliner factions
that typically strongly oppose sharing power and spoils with opposition elites. Moreover, in
electoral autocracies incumbents value their vote shares. Maintaining their dominance in the
electoral arena through large vote margins help them portray an image of invincibility, and
preserve legislative majorities required to amend constitutional rules as they wish (Magaloni,
2006). Hence, autocratic incumbents should also carefully consider the views of voters and
ensure that co-opting a rival party would not turn the voters away from the regime.
Given these considerations even autocratic incumbents with ample resources face limita-
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tions with regards to the extent of resources they can distribute to opposition party elites.
As a result, they must act strategically and seek cooperation of opposition party leaders
selectively. One solution is to employ a divide and conquer strategy by selectively targeting
some parties but not others (Lust-Okar, 2005). Autocrats often resort to co-optation when
faced with political opposition capable to threaten regime stability (Arriola et al., 2021;
Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Buckles, 2016; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006). Drawing on this logic,
we should expect incumbents to seek the cooperation of parties that can credibly threaten
the regime without wasting valuable resources for those that do not pose a significant threat.
Moreover, autocrats can further make the most out of available resources by targeting oppo-
sition parties that regime elites and voters see favorably, at least relative to other opposition
parties.
Opposition party elites also need to assess the potential benefits and costs of aligning with
autocratic incumbents. On the one hand, forging an alliance with the regime can provide
opposition party elites with material benefits, access to political power, and protection from
repression. Moreover, opposition party elites can channel the spoils of office to supporters,
and build up their reputation in the eyes of constituencies that see the opposition as illegit-
imate or unsuited to govern (Magaloni, 2006; Rakner & Van de Walle, 2009). On the other
hand, co-optation can alienate party activists and threaten the leader’s political survival by
triggering internal dissent (Buckles, 2019). For example, Turkey’s Nationalist Action Party
(MHP) experienced internal rebellion and defections following its leader’s decision to align
with the Erdogan regime (TurkishMinute, 2017). Moreover, proximate benefits that opposi-
tion party leaders could reap from co-optation may come at the expense of broader political
reforms and material benefits they could have gained in the future by mobilizing against
the regime. For example, opposition parties such as the Movement of Socialist Democrats
(MDS) and the Popular Unity Party (PUP) that were loyal to the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia
were largely discredited and had little leverage over the design of subsequent democratic
institutions in the aftermath of the Jasmine Revolution.2
In sum, both autocratic incumbents and opposition party elites need to assess the po-
2The MDS won only two seats in elections for the Constituent Assembly which was held on 23 October
2011, whereas the PUP failed to win a seat.
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tential benefits and costs of striking co-optation deals with one another. As I demonstrate
in the following section, the assessments of both sides are to an important degree driven by
party-level factors.
3.2 How Party Organizational Features and Party Positions Drive
Patterns of Co-optation in Autocracies
The argument centers on three party-level factors that shape how autocratic incumbents
and opposition party leaders assess the potential benefits and costs of co-optation: (1) or-
ganizational extensiveness of an opposition party, involving a nationwide network of visible
local branches and ties to social organizations (Duverger, 1959; Kitschelt, 1994); (2) the dis-
persion of internal decision-making authority within party organizations; (3) and ideological
positioning of the incumbent regime and an opposition party.
Opposition parties vary in their capacity to challenge the regime at the ballot box and
beyond, as a function of organizational extensiveness. Party organizational extensiveness
plays a fundamental role in shaping opposition elites’ incentives to align with autocratic
incumbents. The boots on the ground provided by local branches enhance the party’s capac-
ity to mobilize voters, and help maintain linkages to local party members and constituents
overtime (Levitsky, Loxton, Van Dyck, & Domínguez, 2016; Tavits, 2013). Especially where
local-organizational presence is amplified by the ties to prominent social organizations, the
opposition party’s ability to disseminate its messages and cultivate partisan ties among vot-
ers is significantly enhanced (LeBas, 2014; Samuels & Zucco, 2015). Permanent grassroots
presence with the aid of local branches and affiliated social organizations is especially critical
in autocratic settings because opposition elites usually have limited access to media, and gov-
ernment censorship hinders their ability to communicate with voters and their membership
base (Van Dyck, 2017). Hence, opposition parties with an organized presence on the ground
can pose a significant electoral threat to the regime, which provides party leaders with al-
ternative means to push for political concessions and achieve political power. Armed with
an extensive party organization, opposition leaders should be less inclined to make costly
compromises on their anti-regime stance in exchange for the potential benefits of co-optation.
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Moreover, organizational extensiveness increases the ability of party leaders to compete
against the regime beyond the electoral arena. Post-electoral power struggles between op-
position parties and incumbents often play a critical role in gradual regime openings and
democratic breakthroughs (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011; LeBas, 2014; Magaloni, 2010; Schedler,
2002, 2013). Given their enhanced mobilizational capacity, organizationally extensive parties
have the ability to pose a credible threat of post-electoral revolt, which raises the costs of
repression and manipulation on the part of autocratic incumbents (Magaloni, 2010). Conse-
quently, opposition party leaders with extensive organizations face lower costs of remaining
in the opposition camp, and thus have relatively fewer incentives to be co-opted than leaders
with less extensive organizations.
From the incumbents’ perspective, organizationally extensive opposition parties are more
valuable to co-opt because they are more threatening to regime stability. Co-opting such
parties helps incumbents to play the game of multipartyism without facing the necessity
of employing excessively manipulative strategies to remain in power. However, as Buckles
(2019) demonstrates opposition parties with a large activist base are likely to demand greater
concessions than incumbents are willing to make. When opposition parties have a nationwide
organizational infrastructure in the form of local branches and/or ties to prominent social
organizations, they are better able to penetrate into constituencies across the nation and
mobilize their members and activist base against the incumbent regime. These features
further encourage opposition party elites to demand more from incumbents in exchange for
their collaboration. However, given that incumbents often have finite resources available to
distribute to opposition elites, their ability to co-opt organizationally extensive opposition
parties tends to be limited.
Hypothesis 1: Greater party organizational extensiveness is associated with a lower
likelihood that an opposition party will be co-opted by the regime.
How opposition party leaders and autocratic incumbents assess the potential benefits and
risks of striking a co-optation deal is also shaped by the distribution of power within the
opposition party. Party organizations vary in the degree to which decision-making authority
over important aspects of party policy (e.g., candidate selection, campaign strategies etc.) is
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concentrated in the hands of an individual party leader, a small circle of elites, or dispersed
among various members organized at different layers within the organization. The nature
of internal decision-making procedures has important implications for parties’ behavior and
goals (Panebianco, 1988). Party organizations in which the authority is highly concentrated,
party leaders enjoy a greater degree of autonomy and discretion over party strategies. In
contrast, the devolution of power to other party elites or lower cadres requires party leaders to
seek the approval of various internal veto players before committing to a particular strategy.
Opposition party leaders with greater discretion over party strategies should be more
likely to be co-opted than those who need the approval of various internal veto players
to strike a deal with incumbents. The literature on coalition formation in democracies
demonstrates that when decision-making procedures enable party members to influence party
strategies, party leaders’ ability to bargain with potential coalition partners is substantially
diminished (Strøm, 1994). Similarly, the presence of greater internal constraints on the party
leader’s decision-making authority should limit the leader’s ability to make concessions to
the regime and prolong the bargaining process. The decision to align with the incumbent
regime often forces party leaders to compromise on their pursuit of broader long-term po-
litical gains in exchange for short-term office benefits. Such compromises often meet with a
backlash from lower cadres (Buckles, 2019), which typically attach more intrinsic value to
the party’s confrontational stance against the regime (Buckles, 2019; Greene, 2007; LeBas,
2014). Party leaders can ignore internal demands but doing so puts their hold on leadership
at risk, especially when a rival party elite decide to challenge the party leader (Buckles,
2019). Constraints on the party leader stems partly from decentralized leadership selection
procedures that enhance the ability of party members to hold the leader accountable. Parties
that lack such mechanisms of internal accountability impose fewer constraints on the leaders’
ability to make concessions to the regime, reducing the potential costs of co-optation on the
part of party leaders.
Autocratic incumbents’ ability to co-opt opposition parties with dispersed decision-making
procedures is also limited because party leaders with incentives to seek the backing of various
party members should be more likely to demand higher concessions from the regime. Party
leaders may promise to distribute more spoils and rents to party members, but this requires
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them to push for more expansive deals that are costly for the regime. The demands of party
leaders from the regime should increase in parallel to the proportion of party members act-
ing as veto players. Hence, the more dispersed the decision-making authority, the harder it
becomes for autocratic incumbents to co-opt the party.
Hypothesis 2: Greater dispersion of intra-party decision-making authority is associated
with a lower likelihood that a party will be co-opted by the regime.
The impact of organizational extensiveness and the dispersion of decision-making au-
thority is moderated by the ideological distance between an opposition party and autocratic
incumbents. In autocratic party systems, party competition is often two-dimensional. On
one dimension, parties usually compete over policy related cleavages such as broader eco-
nomic conditions or more specific policy areas including, for example, welfare provision,
religion in public domain, and the role of the state in the economy. In addition to the policy
dimension, the question of regime change is often the most important competitive dimen-
sion on which parties are positioned (Greene, 2002). In some autocratic party systems such
as Turkey, Venezuela, and Mexico (pre-2000) both dimensions are salient, whereas in other
party systems parties have discernible differences in terms of their positions on the regime
dimension but not on the policy dimension. I expect the degree to which opposition parties
and autocratic incumbents differ in their positioning along the two dimensions to further
alter the incentives and capabilities of both sides to forge co-optation deals.
When there is no discernible ideological difference between parties, both sides face fewer
constraints when building an alliance. For one, ideological distance exacerbates the costs of
co-opting an opposition party on the part of autocratic incumbents due to heightened risk of
discontent among ruling elites and the regime’s core constituencies. Hardliner internal fac-
tions and core constituencies are particularly likely to oppose sharing spoils and rents with
an ideologically distant opposition party. When the ideologically distant party has an ex-
tensive organization, autocratic incumbents should face especially high costs of co-optation,
because organizational extensiveness already creates incentives for opposition party leaders
to demand greater concessions from the regime in exchange of co-optation. Importantly, the
enhanced risk of alienating a group of regime elites and core constituencies when forming
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an alliance with an ideologically distant opposition party constrains autocratic incumbents
even when they have enough resources to meet the demands of an organizationally extensive
opposition party. Hence, autocratic incumbents should have fewer incentives and ability to
co-opt parties that are both organisationally extensive and ideologically distant from them.
Further, when an opposition party has dispersed decision-making structures, and it is
ideologically distant from autocratic incumbents, it becomes less prone to co-optation. If
party members and core supporters are ideologically motivated, they are more likely to
oppose and veto the party leader’s attempt to compromise on the party’s oppositional stance.
Given that dispersed decision-making procedures enhance the ability of party members to
hold the leader accountable, the party leader faces a greater risk of removal from the party
leadership if she deviates from the party line. As a result, the party leader is significantly
constrained in bargaining with the regime, and in her ability to make concessions to strike a
co-optation deal. Conversely, party organizations giving its members few means to constrain
the party leader, provides the party leader with fewer incentives to remain committed to the
party’s ideological position. In this case, the party leader faces a lower risk of punishment by
party members, making it less costly to align with the incumbent regime despite ideological
differences. The risk of experiencing internal backlash becomes higher for party leaders as the
ideological distance between their party and the incumbent regime increases, and this risk
should be especially pronounced when an opposition party has dispersed decision-making
structures that boost the ability of party members to punish the party leader.
Hypothesis 3: The greater the ideological distance between an opposition party and
autocratic incumbents, the stronger the negative association between opposition party orga-
nizational extensiveness and the likelihood of co-optation.
Hypothesis 4: The greater the ideological distance between an opposition party and au-
tocratic incumbents, the stronger the negative association between the dispersion of internal




I examine these claims on a sample of 328 parties from 64 electoral autocracies–defined
as autocratic regimes that hold formally competitive elections for the national executive
and the legislature–between 1970 and 2019.3 The data set includes repeated observations
of major opposition parties (> 5 % of vote share) across 254 legislative elections, which
results in a sample size of 604 party-election-year observations. The unit of analysis is a
party-election-year nested in an electoral autocracy.
4.2 Dependent Variable
Co-optation is a dummy variable that indicates whether an opposition party joins a pre-
electoral coalition led by an autocratic incumbent (e.g. Malaysian Chinese Association
(MCA), Malaysia 1952 –); an opposition party member accepts a cabinet position after
the election (e.g. Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), Senegal 1992);4 an opposition party
declares its support for the incumbent’s election bid without building a formal electoral al-
liance with the incumbent (e.g. National Convention Party (NCP), Ghana 1992); and/or
if an opposition party provides parliamentary support to the incumbent government (e.g.
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), Russia 2000 –). I coded this variable crossing
original expert survey data (Lührmann et al., 2020b),5 Political Handbook of the World
series (1975 - 2019), and cabinet data from Nyrup and Bramwell (2020). A party is coded as
co-opted at a party-election-year if any of the aforementioned conditions hold in subsequent
years until the next party-election-year. This way of operationalization provides a more
conservative test of the hypotheses, but it seeks to mitigate potential simultaneity bias that
can be caused by a party’s inclusion in a pre-electoral coalition or its declaration of support
3More information on the sample construction procedure, and the list of elections included in the sample
is provided in the Appendix Section 2.
4This excludes cases where a party member accepts a cabinet position and consequently resigns or gets
expelled from the party.
5Appendix Section 3 presents the exact wording of the survey question.
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for the incumbent’s election campaign.6 In total, the data set includes 242 events of co-











































































Figure 1: Percent of party-year observations with co-optation between 1970 and 2019.
Figure 1 displays the patterns of opposition party co-optation between 1970 and 2019.
The vertical axis shows the percent of party-election-year observations with co-optation over
five to seven year intervals (horizontal axis). The figure demonstrates that co-optation of
opposition parties has been prevalent in electoral autocracies, and that there is a clear
uptrend since 1970. Opposition party co-optation has become more frequent since the 1990s
when many autocracies in sub-Saharan Africa and Central and Eastern Europe introduced
multiparty elections. This is in line with the notion that the transition to multiparty politics
in these regions have resulted in increasing attempts by incumbents to control opposition
party elites through co-optation (Arriola et al., 2021; Gel’man, 2005; Rakner & Van de Walle,
2009).
6The results do not change if pre-electoral coalitions are excluded from the analysis (see Appendix Table
2).
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4.3 Main Independent Variables: Measuring Party Organizational
Features and Ideological Positions
The argument posits that co-optation is a function of internal features of opposition parties
and their ideological proximity to the incumbent regime. I use expert survey data collected
as part of the V-Party project (Lührmann et al., 2020b). V-Party is the most comprehensive
data set on party organizations and party stances to date, allowing this study to present the
first cross-country party-level quantitative investigation of the relationship between party
organizational features, ideological stances, and co-optation. The appendix presents the
exact wording of the relevant survey questions.
The first part of the argument suggests that organizationally extensive opposition parties
is less prone to co-optation. I operationalize organizational extensiveness by building an
index composed of three interrelated indicators. The first indicator measures the extent
to which a party has a nationwide territorial organization in the form of permanent local
branches at the municipal level. The second indicator focuses on the scope of a party’s
local reach by measuring the degree to which party activists and personnel have an active
presence in local communities during and outside the election season. Finally, the third
indicator measures the strength of a party’s ties to prominent social organizations (i.e.,
labor unions, business organizations, religious organizations, etc.). The ties are stronger
when a party controls prominent social organizations that contribute to its operations by
providing material and personnel resources, as well as by helping a party in propagating its
message to organizations’ members and beyond. The three indicators are standardized and
summed together to build the composite index of organizational extensiveness, where higher
scores indicate greater extensiveness. The indicators are highly correlated, suggesting that
parties that score high (low) in one indicator often score high (low) in other indicators as
well (see Table 1 in Appendix Section 5).
To measure the dispersion of internal decision-making authority, I construct an index us-
ing two indicators. The first indicator captures the devolution of decision-making authority
over the nomination of the party candidates for legislative elections. Lower values on this
indicator denote that a party leader has relatively less unilateral power over the nomina-
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tion of the party’s legislative candidates, and thus nomination processes are characterized
by collegial decision-making procedures incorporating the interests of other party members.
The second indicator measures party personalization, which is higher for parties that pri-
marily operate as an instrument to further individual ambitions of a party leader rather
than representing the interests of a broader party organization. At extremes, personalized
parties are those that provide individual party leaders with full autonomy from other party
members without facing effective constraints in setting up party strategies. At the opposite
end of the spectrum, non-personalized parties are known with collegial decision-making pro-
cedures where party members have more voice in party operations. The two indicators are
standardized and summed together to build the composite index of dispersion of internal
decision-making authority. The correlation coefficient between the two indicators is strong
at 0.44 (see Table 1 in Appendix Section 5). Higher scores on the index indicate increasing
dispersion of internal decision-making authority in a party organization.
To test Hypotheses 3 and 4 that suggest the impact of opposition party organizational
features is moderated by the ideological distance between an opposition party and the in-
cumbent regime, I utilize two indicators from the V-Party expert survey. The first indicator
relates to a party’s overall ideological stance on economic issues and captures its position on
the left-right scale. I rescaled the indicator to 0-1 through the normal cumulative distribu-
tion function, and then calculated the absolute distance between an opposition party and
the incumbent party. In contexts where the economic policy cleavage is not salient there is
not much observable difference between individual parties, and thus the absolute distance
between parties is close to zero. However, the spread of the data suggests that there are
notable differences in party positions on the economic policy dimension in autocratic party
systems (See Figure 1A and Figure 1E in Appendix Section 5).
The second indicator of ideological positions measures the competition over the question
of regime change that is often the most important competitive dimension on which parties
are located in autocratic party systems. The measure captures the extent to which the
leadership of a party is committed to democratic principles such as free and fair multiparty
elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association. At one end of the spectrum,
a party follows what Greene (2002) calls “regime-mobilizing strategy by promoting itself as
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a party of democratic reform.” At the other end of the spectrum, a party openly supports
the maintenance of the autocratic form of government. This indicator is also rescaled to 0-1
using the normal cumulative distribution function. I then calculated the absolute distance
between an opposition party and the incumbent party. The overall distribution of opposition
party positions on the regime dimension highlights that opposition parties vary substantially
in the extent to which they seek to promote democratic reforms (see Figure 1B in Appendix
Section 5).7 The indicator also recognizes the fact that incumbent parties can be democratic
reform oriented or highly autocratic, although the former type of incumbent parties are rare
(see Figure 1C in Appendix Section 5).
I standardized and combined the two indicators to create a unified measure of ideological
distance between an opposition party and the incumbent party. Accordingly, parties that
have highly divergent positions on both dimensions score especially high in terms of ideo-
logical distance, whereas parties that are located closer to one another on both dimensions
score low in terms of ideological distance. The variable ranges from 1.275 to 1.947 with a
mean of −0.05 and a standard deviation of 0.783, suggesting that ideological proximity of
opposition parties to autocratic incumbents varies substantially (see Figure 1G in Appendix
Section 5).
4.4 Model Specification
I estimate a series of hierarchical logistic models to account for the relationship between
party organizational features, party positions, and the likelihood of co-optation. I fit random
intercepts logit models, allowing intercepts to vary by party and country, so that the within-
group residuals become conditionally independent and identically distributed. The models
incorporate estimated group-level variance components, which would otherwise remain in
the error term and result in regressor-error dependency (Snijders & Bosker, 2012).8
7An opposition party may not be supportive of democratic form government, but it can still be in favor
of regime change. As such, the measure may underestimate the distance between an opposition party and
the incumbent party on the regime dimension. This should result in more conservative estimates, and thus
make it harder to reject the null hypotheses.
8This modelling strategy produces more efficient and consistent estimates of rarely changing variables
such as party organizational features in small samples than models treating cross-section units as fixed effects
(Clark & Linzer, 2015).
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I control for several potential party-level confounding variables. First, the past instances
of co-optation may affect organizational features, ideological positions, and the likelihood
of co-optation. Accordingly, I control for the number of times a party was co-opted in
the past. Controlling for the past instances of co-optation should account for latent factors
that make parties previously co-opted by the incumbent regime systematically different than
non-coopted parties in ways that are related to party organizational features and ideological
stances. Moreover, I add a dummy variable indicating whether a party mainly derives its
support from a particular ethnic and/or regional group. I also include a dummy variable
for religious parties that often have extensive organizations and dispersed decision-making
structures (see, for example, Wegner, 2011). The data on ethnic–regional and religious
parties are collected through the V-Party expert survey.
I also control for several variables that are related to the broader competitive environ-
ment. These variables account for the possibility that opposition co-optation is driven by
incumbents’ access to economic resources, socioeconomic context, and institutional frame-
work. One explanation is that the availability of natural resources enhances incumbents’
ability to buy off opponents (Arriola, 2009). I use data on oil production per capita to cap-
ture the availability of natural resources (Ross & Mahdavi, 2015). Moreover, in economically
developed countries, opposition groups may be more willing to forego material benefits asso-
ciated with co-optation (Magaloni, 2006), which is likely to create incentives for opposition
party leaders to maintain their oppositional stance. To adjust for this possibility, I control
for the level of economic development with a measure of GDP per capita from Bolt and
Van Zanden (2014).
Previous research demonstrates that presidential systems are associated with party orga-
nizational weakness and greater concentration of decision-making authority in the hands of
an individual party leader (Rakner & Van de Walle, 2009; Samuels & Shugart, 2010). More-
over, in presidential regimes autocrats face few executive constraints that can hinder their
ability to co-opt opposition elites (Rakner & Van de Walle, 2009). Accordingly, the models
include a dummy variable for (semi) presidential systems (the reference category is parlia-
mentary system) from Wig, Hegre, and Regan (2015). Finally, opposition groups’ ability to
invest in party organizations and their willingness to align with the regime should depend
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on the level of regime openness. Regimes that are highly repressive and hold excessively
manipulated elections can raise the costs of investing in party organizations and adopting
ideologically distant positions from incumbents on the part of opposition elites. To adjust
for this possibility, I control for the level of democracy using electoral democracy index from
the Varieties of Democracy Project data set (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al., 2020a, 2020b).
While I also control for additional variables in robustness tests, the main models are
based on relatively parsimonious specifications that aim to minimize post-treatment bias,
and only include aforementioned controls for which there are strong theoretical reasons to
be considered as confounders. The main results remain when controlling for additional
variables (see Section 5.1).
5 Results
Table 1 presents the results predicting opposition party co-optation. Model 1 is the base-
line specification only including organizational extensiveness and the dispersion of internal
decision-making authority. The coefficients for organizational extensiveness (β = −0.31, p <
0.01) and the dispersion of internal decision-making authority (β = −0.70, p < 0.05) are
statistically significant and, in line with Hypotheses 1 and 2 both are negatively associated
with the probability of co-optation. The results for these variables are only slightly atten-
uated in Model 2 that also accounts for ideological proximity of an opposition party to the
incumbent regime. As expected, the coefficient estimate of ideological distance suggests that
opposition parties that are ideologically distant from autocratic incumbents are less likely to
be co-opted (β = −1.54, p < 0.01). Model 3 adds the past instances of co-optation, which
is positively associated with the likelihood of co-optation, indicating that opposition parties
that have more past experience of collaboration with the incumbents are especially likely
to be co-opted in subsequent periods (β = 0.80, p < 0.01). In Model 3, the estimated co-
efficients for organizational extensiveness, the dispersion of decision-making authority, and
ideological distance are similar to Model 2. The results in Models 1-3 remain unaltered in
Model 4 that accounts for additional party-level factors by introducing controls for ethnic-
regional and religious parties. The results suggests that whether an opposition party derives
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its support from a particular ethnic or regional group has no implications for the likelihood
of co-optation. However, religion-based opposition parties such Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party
(PAS) in Malaysia are significantly less likely to be co-opted than other parties.9
Table 1: Party organizational features, ideological positions, and co-optation.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Organizational extensiveness −0.31∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Dispersion of decision-making aut. −0.70∗∗ −0.55∗ −0.54∗∗ −0.62∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗ −0.52∗∗ −0.58∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.30) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
Ideological distance −1.54∗∗∗ −1.35∗∗∗ −1.34∗∗∗ −1.35∗∗∗ −1.33∗∗∗ −1.39∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.26) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.28)
Previous co-optation (#) 0.80∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.26) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29)
Ethnic-regional 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.22
(0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.42)
Religious −1.08∗ −1.08∗ −1.19∗ −1.09∗
(0.64) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61)
Presidential 0.24 0.24 0.25
(0.65) (0.66) (0.65)
Electoral democracy −1.70 −1.47 −1.68
(1.53) (1.55) (1.53)
log Oil production pc. 0.15 0.15 0.15
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
log GDP pc. −0.77∗∗ −0.81∗∗ −0.76∗∗
(0.33) (0.34) (0.33)
Organizational extensiveness X −0.15∗
Ideological distance (0.09)
Dispersion of decision-making aut. X −0.08
Ideological distance (0.25)
AIC 564.38 484.33 475.86 476.42 467.14 466.50 469.07
BIC 586.40 510.42 506.31 515.56 523.33 527.02 529.59
Log Likelihood −277.19 −236.16 −230.93 −229.21 −220.57 −219.25 −220.54
Num. obs. 604 572 572 572 557 557 557
Num. groups: Party 328 312 312 312 308 308 308
Num. groups: Country 64 63 63 63 62 62 62
Var: Party (Intercept) 6.18 5.69 1.36 0.83 0.48 0.40 0.49
Var: Country (Intercept) 9.53 7.54 3.81 3.81 3.18 3.57 3.19
Hierarchical logit models. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
Models 1-4 corroborate Hypotheses 1 and 2 that suggest opposition parties with exten-
sive organizations and those that disperse decision-making authority among various party
members have a lower probability of being co-opted by autocratic incumbents. Model 5
9Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) became a junior coalition partner to the United Malays National
Organisation (UMNO) government. But in 1977 party withdrew from the partnership that was widely
unpopular among its core supporters. The party has been in the opposition camp since 1977.
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introduces control variables such as oil production per capita, GDP per capita, presidential
regimes, and the level of electoral democracy. The results lend further support for Hypothe-
ses 1 and 2. The point estimate for organizational extensiveness indicates that, on average,
a one-unit increase in organizational extensiveness reduces the probability of co-optation
by about 20 percent (exp(β = −0.22) = 0.80). Substantively speaking, a change in or-
ganizational extensiveness from 20th percentile (−2.22) to 80th percentile (2.92), which is
about the difference between Just Russia (SR, Russia) in 2016 and National Action Party
(PAN, Mexico) in 1985, reduces the probability of co-optation by around 15 percent. Fur-
thermore, the results suggests that, on average, a one-unit increase in the dispersion of
internal decision-making authority reduces the probability of co-optation by around 40 per-
cent (exp(β = −0.52) = 0.60). Moving from 20th percentile (−1.01) to 80th percentile
(0.82) on the index, which is about the difference between Algerian National Front in 2017
(FNA, Algeria) and New Patriotic Party in 1996 (NPP, Ghana), decreases the probability
of co-optation by about 15 percent. Overall, the evidence suggests that opposition parties
with extensive organizations and those in which decision-making procedures are dispersed
among various party members are significantly less likely to be co-opted.
Models 6 and 7 evaluate Hypotheses 3 and 4 by interacting party organizational features
and ideological distance. Given that the magnitude, direction, and statistical significance of
the interaction terms as well as their constitutive terms can be misleading and not mean-
ingful (Berry, Golder, & Milton, 2012), Figure 2A and Figure 2C plot the marginal effects
of party organizational features at the full range of the values of ideological distance. In
line with Hypothesis 3, Figure 2A demonstrates that with increasing levels of ideological
distance, the negative marginal effect of organizational extensiveness on the probability of
co-optation becomes stronger. The effect becomes statistically significant when the value of
ideological distance surpasses −0.5. The underlying histogram in the plot shows that the
statistically significant relationship applies to more than 65 percent of the observations that
have an ideological distance score of more than −0.5. Substantively, the coefficient estimate
of organizational extensiveness becomes roughly about twice the size of the coefficient in
Model 5 for opposition parties with an ideological distance to the incumbent regime similar
to that of Tanzania’s Party for Democracy and Congress (Chadema) in 2000 or Mexico’s
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Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD) in 1994.10 In about 35 percent of the observations
where opposition parties and the incumbent regime have ideological positions relatively closer
to one another, the impact of organizational extensiveness on the probability of co-optation
becomes indeterminate.
Figure 2C plots the marginal effect of the dispersion of internal decision-making authority
over the full range of the values of ideological distance. In line with Hypothesis 4, the negative
marginal effect of the dispersion of internal decision-making authority becomes stronger as
the ideological distance between an opposition party and autocratic incumbents increases.
The effect is statistically significant over the values of ideological distance ranging from about
−0.78 to 1.01, which covers 67 percent of the observations. Substantively, however, the effect
is only slightly altered as ideological distance increases. The estimated coefficient is about
0.07 point larger than the coefficient in Model 5 for opposition parties that have ideological
distance from autocratic incumbents similar to Cameroon’s Social Democratic Front (SDF)
in 2013, which has a score of 1.01.
Figure 2B and Figure 2D displays the marginal effect of ideological distance across the
range of the values of organizational features. Figure 2B demonstrates that the marginal
effect of ideological distance becomes substantially stronger as organizational extensiveness
increases. Similarly, Figure 2D indicates stronger negative effect of ideological distance
on the probability of co-optation as decision-making procedures within opposition parties
become more dispersed. Overall, the observed associations provide evidence in support of
Hypotheses 3 and 4. The effect of organizational features on co-optation is conditional on
ideological distance between an opposition party and the incumbent regime. The opposite
is also true as indicated by Figure 2B and Figure 2D: the effect of ideological distance is
moderated by opposition party organizational features.


















































































































Figure 2: The conditional impact of organizational features and ideological distance on the
likelihood of co-optation.
The findings suggest that opposition party co-optation is largely driven by party-level
factors. Looking at the country-level factors across Models 5-7, only the level of economic
development, proxied by GDP per capita, has a statistically significant relationship with the
likelihood of party co-optation. The coefficient for GDP per capita suggests that parties
competing in economically less developed electoral autocracies may face greater pressures
and incentives to align with autocratic incumbents. Other country-level variables denoting
26
oil production per capita, the level of democracy, and weather a country has presidential
system or not, have expected coefficient signs, but they do not have statistically significant
associations with party co-optation.
5.1 Robustness Tests
To assess the robustness of the findings I conduct several additional analyses. First, Appendix
Table 2 replicates Models 1-7 by excluding pre-electoral coalitions and an opposition party’s
declaration of support for incumbents’ election bid as co-optation events to further safeguard
against the possibility of simultaneity bias. The results in Appendix Table 2 provide further
confidence to the main results in that the estimates are substantively similar to those in
Table 1.
Second, I control for opposition party seat share and party age (both log transformed),
and replicate Models 5-7 in Table 1. Including party seat share allows for testing the rela-
tionship between opposition party electoral performance and co-optation, whereas party age
should account for the possibility that older parties may be better positioned to coordinate
anti-regime collective action (Gandhi & Reuter, 2013), and thus they may have greater in-
centive to remain in the opposition camp. It should be noted that party seat share and party
age is subject to post-treatment bias because they are to a large extent a function of party
organizational features. Nevertheless, controlling for these additional party-level variables
do not alter the main findings (see Appendix Table 3).
Third, I control for additional variables related to the broader competitive environment.
Specifically, Models 11A-15A in Appendix Table 4 replicates Model 5-7 in Table 1 by con-
trolling for the V-Dem presidentialism index (Coppedge et al., 2020a, 2020b), the extent to
which a state owns and controls economic capital (Coppedge et al., 2020a, 2020b), ethnic
fractionalization (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003), and the
seat share of an autocratic ruling party. These controls aim to assess several alternative
explanations. First, the V-Dem presidentialism index includes various indicators measuring
the constraints on the executive, and thus it allows for testing whether opposition party
co-optation is affected by executive constraints. Furthermore, scholars suggest that where
opposition parties lack access to independent private capital their capacity to effectively
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coordinate anti-regime collective action decreases (Arriola, 2013; Greene, 2007). Building
on this logic, it is possible that in countries where the state controls a sizable share of the
economic activity, opposition elites have limited capacity to invest in organizational features
and have greater incentives to gain access to economic capital by aligning with incumbents.
To account for this explanation, I control for the degree of the state control over the economy.
It is also plausible that incumbents may have greater incentives to co-opt opposition parties
when they lack parliamentary majority as is the case for the Erdogan regime in Turkey.
For this reason, I control for the share of parliamentary seats held by an autocratic ruling
party. Controlling for these additional country-level factors do not alter the main findings
in Table 1. It is notable that the inclusion of these variables do not improve the model
fit, suggesting that these factors do not perform well in explaining party-level co-optation.
Finally, the results remain when including regional dummies to ensure the estimates are not
affected by the unobserved time-invariant region-specific characteristics (see Model 16A in
Appendix Table 4).
Last, the data set includes missing observations (see Appendix Section 1), and missingness
can be problematic given the relatively small sample size. To ensure that missingness does
not bias the results, I use multiple imputation as described in King, Honaker, Joseph, and
Scheve (2001). I impute five data sets using Amelia II package in R, run models in Table 1
on each imputed data set, and then combine the estimates. Table 5 in the appendix presents
the results based on the imputed data sets, which are highly similar to Models 1-7 in Table 1.
6 Conclusion
Opposition party co-optation is an important survival strategy widely employed by autocratic
incumbents to survive in power. Despite its prevalence, however, little has been done to
explain why some opposition parties are co-opted but not others. This article fills this gap
by demonstrating that opposition party co-optation is, to a large extent, shaped by the
internal features of opposition parties, and the ideological distance between an opposition
party and the incumbent regime.
This article demonstrates that organizationally extensive opposition parties, and those
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that distribute internal decision-making authority among various party members, are less
likely to be co-opted. Party organizational extensiveness, i.e. nationwide network of active
local branches, and entrenched ties to social organizations, boosts opposition party leaders’
ability to mobilize against the regime, and survive in autocratic settings, reducing their
incentives to make costly compromises on their oppositional stance to the incumbent regime.
Moreover, where party leaders face greater internal constraints in bargaining with autocratic
incumbents due to dispersed decision-making structures, their ability to make concessions to
the regime is significantly hindered, reducing the chances of striking a co-optation agreement
with the incumbent regime.
The findings also suggest that as the ideological distance between an opposition party
and the incumbent regime increases, the negative impact of these organizational attributes is
exacerbated. The costs of establishing a co-optation agreement increases for both autocratic
incumbents and opposition party leaders when an opposition party has an extensive orga-
nization, dispersed decision-making structures, and ideologically position itself distant from
the incumbent regime. Thus, the findings demonstrate that opposition party organizational
features and ideological positions substantially shape the ability of autocratic incumbents
to co-opt a particular opposition party, regardless of the availability of patronage resources
that they can distribute to opposition party leaders, or repressive tactics that they often use
to discourage opposition party leaders from maintaining their anti-regime stance.
This is the first cross-national party-level quantitative study of the relationship between
internal characteristics of opposition parties, their ideological orientations, and elite co-
optation in electoral autocracies. While the findings contribute to the current knowledge
about opposition party co-optation (e.g. Arriola et al., 2021; Buckles, 2019; Kelly, 2018),
they also promise to further our understanding of the functions and consequences of multi-
party elections in autocracies. Recognizing the diversity of opposition party organizational
features and their ideological orientations can further the debate on when and why multi-
party elections can undermine autocratic regime stability (e.g. Bernhard et al., 2020; Bunce
& Wolchik, 2011; Schedler, 2013). How opposition party characteristics shape the incentives
and capabilities of opposition elites to force for a regime change deserves more attention.
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Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Organizational extensiveness 604 −0.003 2.652 −6.814 −1.734 1.925 7.299
Dispersion of intra-party decision-making authority 604 −0.360 1.025 −2.727 −1.020 0.270 2.835
Ideological distance 572 −0.005 0.783 −1.275 −0.649 0.543 1.947
Number of past co-optation 604 0.439 1.260 0 0 0 9
Ethnic-regional party 604 0.281 0.450 0 0 1 1
Religious party 604 0.070 0.255 0 0 0 1
Presidential 604 0.818 0.386 0 1 1 1
Oil production pc. (log) 594 2.405 2.842 0.000 0.000 5.399 9.448
GPD pc (log) 596 8.306 0.946 6.297 7.519 9.044 11.114
Opposition party seat share (log) 604 2.134 0.900 0.000 1.589 2.744 4.615
Opposition party age (log) 604 2.319 1.230 0.000 1.386 3.258 4.812
V-Dem presidentialism index 604 0.645 0.215 0.136 0.494 0.831 0.982
V-Dem state ownerhsip of the economy 604 0.074 0.893 −2.939 −0.415 0.723 2.125
Ethnic fractionalization 604 0.517 0.239 0.002 0.339 0.710 0.930
Incumbent party seat share 604 52.851 25.626 0.000 37.300 72.100 100.000
The data on oil production per capita and GDP per capita are log transformed. Oil production per capita is log transformed
after adding 1 to each value to deal with zeros.
I have updated the variable on “the independence of selection of executives” until 2019 in Wig et al. (2015). (Semi) Presidential
systems are operationalized as systems in which the executive is elected independently of the legislature.
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2 List of electoral autocracies (1970 - 2019).
The sample excludes closed autocracies that do not hold formally competitive elections for
the national executive (e.g. China and Saudi Arabia that do not hold multiparty elections,
as well as autocracies such as Morocco that only hold formally competitive elections for the
legislature), or those that hold elections without full male or full female suffrage (e.g. South
Africa until 1994). Elections that are followed by a democratic transition in the subsequent
year are excluded from the analysis (e.g. Ghana 2000).
The coding of electoral autocracies involves three steps.
1. First, I use data from Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013) to establish the sample of
autocracies. The data set covers all countries until 2015. I expanded the data set until
2019. The sample additionally covers the following elections: Algeria 2017, Belarus
2016, Belarus 2019, Russia 2016, Djibouti 2018, Uganda 2016, Mozambique 2019,
Ivory Coast 2016, Turkey 2018.
2. In the second step, I utilize data from the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy to
select autocracies that hold multiparty elections for both the national executive and
the legislature with full male or female suffrage (Skaaning, Gerring, & Bartusevičius,
2015).
3. Finally, I cross-check the sample of countries with the National Elections Across Democ-
racy and Autocracy Data Set (NELDA), and remove cases where executive elections
have no bearing on the selection of de facto leader of the country (e.g. Military regime
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3 Coding opposition party co-optation
A party is coded as co-opted at a party-election-year if any of the following four conditions
is observed in subsequent years until the next party-election-year. Information on the four
criteria was collected using several sources.
1. Opposition party joins a pre-electoral coalition led by the autocratic incumbent.
Source: V-Party Data Set variable, v2paallian (Lührmann et al., 2020a). In addition,
Political Handbook of the World series (1975 - 2019).
2. Opposition party declares its support to the incumbent’s election bid without building
a formal electoral alliance with the incumbent.
Source: Political Handbook of the World series (1975 - 2019).
3. Opposition party provides parliamentary support to the incumbent government.
Source: V-Party Data Set variable, v2pagovsup (Lührmann et al., 2020a). In addition,
Political Handbook of the World series (1975 - 2019).
4. Opposition party member is appointed to the cabinet.
Source: Cabinet data from Nyrup and Bramwell (2020).
V-Party survey asks experts to code whether the party supports and/or is part of the
government formed immediately after an election. In presidential systems where the elections
for the executive and legislative branches of government are non-concurrent, the measure
informs us about whether the party supports the existing government.
Variable: v2pagovsup (Lührmann et al., 2020a).
Expert survey question:
Question: Does this party support the government formed immediately after this election?
Responses:
0: Yes, as senior partner. The Head of Government belongs to this party.
1: Yes, as junior partner. The Head of Government does not belong to this party, but one
or more cabinet ministers do.
2: Yes, but the party is not officially represented in government.
3: No, party is in opposition to the government.
4: Not applicable. No government took office based on this election (yet). (In autocracies,
this response option typically corresponds to the cases where elections were annulled.)
Variable: v2paallian (Lührmann et al., 2020a).
Was the party part of a temporary pre-electoral alliance in this national election or is the
entity actually an alliance?
Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes, party was part of an alliance.
2: Yes, entity is an alliance of two or more parties.
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If the party was part of an alliance, I identified whether the alliance is led by the autocratic
ruling party using the V-Party variable, v2panaallian, which includes information on the
names of pre-electoral alliances, and checked for the parties included in the alliance.
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4 Opposition Party Co-optation (1970 – 2019).
Country Party Election Year
Albania Republican Party of Albania 1996
Albania Albanian National Front Party 1996
Albania Social Democratic Party of Albania 1997
Algeria Movement for the Society of Peace 1997
Algeria Movement of the Islamic Renaissance 1997
Algeria Movement for the Society of Peace 2002
Algeria Movement for National Reform 2002
Algeria Movement for the Society of Peace 2007
Algeria Movement for National Reform 2012
Algeria Movement of the Islamic Renaissance 2012
Algeria Algerian National Front 2017
Armenia Armenian Revolutionary Federation 1999
Armenia National Democratic Union 1999
Armenia Rule of Law / Armenian Renaissance 2003
Armenia Armenian Revolutionary Federation 2003
Armenia Armenian Revolutionary Federation 2007
Armenia Prosperous Armenia Party 2007
Armenia Rule of Law / Armenian Renaissance 2007
Armenia Prosperous Armenia Party 2012
Armenia Rule of Law / Armenian Renaissance 2012
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan National Independence Party 1995
Bangladesh Bangladesh Muslim League 1979
Bangladesh National Party (Ershad) 2008
Bangladesh National Party (Ershad) 2014
Belarus Agrarian Party 1995
Belarus Agrarian Party 2000
Belarus Communist Party of Belarus 2016
Belarus Liberal Democratic Party 2019
Burkina Faso African Regroupment Party 1978
Burkina Faso National Convention of Progressive Patriots–Social Democratic Party 1992
Burkina Faso Alliance for Democracy and Federation 1992
Burkina Faso Alliance for Democracy and Federation 1997
Burkina Faso Alliance for Democracy and Federation–African Democratic Rally 2002
Burkina Faso Alliance for Democracy and Federation–African Democratic Rally 2007
Burkina Faso Alliance for Democracy and Federation–African Democratic Rally 2012
Cambodia National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia 1998
Cambodia National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia 2003
Cambodia National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia 2008
Cambodia Norodom Ranariddh Party 2008
Cameroon Union of the Peoples of Cameroon 1992
Cameroon National Union for Democracy and Progress 1997
Central African Republic Action Party for Development 2011
Central African Republic Movement for Democracy and Development 2011
Democratic Republic of the Congo Movement for the Liberation of the Congo 2006
Democratic Republic of the Congo Forces for Renewal 2006
Democratic Republic of the Congo Unified Lumumbist Party 2006
Democratic Republic of the Congo Social Movement for Renewal 2006
Democratic Republic of the Congo People’s Party for Peace and Democracy 2011
Democratic Republic of the Congo Movement for the Liberation of the Congo 2011
Democratic Republic of the Congo Social Movement for Renewal 2011
Democratic Republic of the Congo Union for the Congolese Nation 2011
Djibouti Movement for Democratic Renewal and Development / Party for Democratic Renewal 1992
Djibouti Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy 1997
Djibouti Movement for Democratic Renewal and Development / Party for Democratic Renewal 1997
Egypt Liberal Socialists Party 1976
Egypt Liberal Socialists Party 1987
Egypt Free Egyptians Party 2011
Egypt New Wafd Party 2015
Egypt Free Egyptians Party 2015
Egypt Nation’s Future Party 2015
Equatorial Guinea Liberal Party 1993
Equatorial Guinea Social Democratic Union 1993
Gabon Gabonese Progress Party 1990
Gabon National Regeneration Movement 1990
Gabon National Woodcutters (Lumberjacks) Rally – Rally for Gabon 1996
Gabon Gabonese Progress Party 1996
Gabon National Woodcutters (Lumberjacks) Rally – Rally for Gabon 2001
Gabon National Woodcutters (Lumberjacks) Rally – Rally for Gabon 2006
Gabon Union of the Gabonese People 2006
Georgia National Democratic Party of Georgia 1992
Georgia Democratic Party 1992
Georgia Unity Bloc 1992
Georgia Union for the Democratic Revival 1995
Georgia National Democratic Party of Georgia 1995
Georgia Union for the Democratic Revival 1999
Georgia Industry will save Georgia 1999
Georgia New Rights 2003
Georgia Union for the Democratic Revival 2003
Ghana National Convention Party 1992
Guinea Union for Progress and Renewal 2002
Guinea-Bissau Resistance of Guinea-Bissau-Bafatá Movement 1999
Guinea-Bissau United Social Democratic Party 2004
Guinea-Bissau Social Renewal Party 2004
Guinea-Bissau Social Renewal Party 2008
Guinea-Bissau Republican Party for Independence and Development 2008
Haiti Democratic Alliance Party 2006
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Haiti Lavalas Political Organization / Struggling People’s Organization 2006
Haiti Fusion of Haitian Social Democrats 2006
Haiti Haiti in Action 2010
Haiti Together We Are Strong 2010
Haiti Lanvi Organisation 2010
Haiti Inite 2010
Haiti Haiti in Action 2015
Ivory Coast Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire — African Democratic Rally 2011
Kazakhstan Federation of Trade Unions of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1994
Kazakhstan Democratic Party 1995
Kazakhstan Federation of Trade Unions of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1995
Kazakhstan Agrarian Party of Kazakhstan 1999
Kazakhstan Civic Party of Kazakhstan 1999
Kazakhstan Agrarian Party of Kazakhstan 2004
Kazakhstan All Together 2004
Kazakhstan Democratic Party of Kazakhstan Bright Path 2004
Kazakhstan Democratic Party of Kazakhstan Bright Path 2012
Kazakhstan Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan 2012
Kyrgyzstan Social Democratic Party Kyrgystan 1995
Kyrgyzstan Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan 2000
Kyrgyzstan My Country Party of Action 2000
Kyrgyzstan Democratic Women’s Party of Kyrgyzstan 2000
Kyrgyzstan Political Party of Afghan War Veterans 2000
Kyrgyzstan Union of Democratic Forces 2000
Kyrgyzstan Social Democratic Party Kyrgystan 2007
Kyrgyzstan Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan 2007
Kyrgyzstan Socialist Party ’Fatherland’ 2010
Kyrgyzstan Dignity 2010
Kyrgyzstan Respublika 2010
Kyrgyzstan Ata Zhurt / Fatherland 2010
Kyrgyzstan Socialist Party ’Fatherland’ 2015
Kyrgyzstan Önügüü–Progress 2015
Kyrgyzstan Bir Bol 2015
Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan Party 2015
Madagascar Popular Impulse for National Unity 1977
Madagascar Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar 1977
Madagascar Party for Proletarian Power / Movement for the Progress of Madagascar 1983
Madagascar Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar 1983
Madagascar Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar 1989
Madagascar Political-based groups working together 2013
Malaysia Malaysian Indian Congress 1974
Malaysia Malaysian Chinese Association 1974
Malaysia United Bumiputera Heritage Party 1974
Malaysia Sarawak National Party 1974
Malaysia Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party 1974
Malaysia United Sabah National Organisation 1974
Malaysia Malaysian Chinese Association 1978
Malaysia Sabah People’s United Front 1978
Malaysia United Bumiputera Heritage Party 1978
Malaysia Sarawak National Party 1978
Malaysia Malaysian Indian Congress 1978
Malaysia United Bumiputera Heritage Party 1982
Malaysia Malaysian Indian Congress 1982
Malaysia Malaysian Chinese Association 1982
Malaysia Sabah People’s United Front 1982
Malaysia United Sabah Party 1986
Malaysia Malaysian Chinese Association 1986
Malaysia Malaysian Indian Congress 1986
Malaysia United Bumiputera Heritage Party 1986
Malaysia United Bumiputera Heritage Party 1990
Malaysia United Sabah Party 1990
Malaysia Malaysian Chinese Association 1990
Malaysia Malaysian Indian Congress 1990
Malaysia Malaysian Indian Congress 1995
Malaysia United Sabah Party 1995
Malaysia Malaysian Chinese Association 1995
Malaysia United Bumiputera Heritage Party 1995
Malaysia United Bumiputera Heritage Party 1999
Malaysia Malaysian Chinese Association 1999
Malaysia United Sabah Party 1999
Malaysia Malaysian Indian Congress 1999
Malaysia Malaysian Indian Congress 2004
Malaysia Malaysian Chinese Association 2004
Malaysia United Bumiputera Heritage Party 2004
Malaysia United Bumiputera Heritage Party 2008
Malaysia Malaysian Chinese Association 2008
Malaysia Malaysian Indian Congress 2008
Malaysia United Bumiputera Heritage Party 2013
Malaysia Malaysian Chinese Association 2013
Malaysia Malaysian Indian Congress 2013
Mali The Alliance for Democracy in Mali – Pan-African Party for Liberty, Solidarity and Justice 2013
Mauritania Rally for Democracy and Unity 1992
Mauritania Union for Democracy and Progress 2001
Mauritania Rally for Democracy and Unity 2001
Mauritania Union of the Forces of Progress 2006
Mauritania People’s Progressive Alliance 2006
Mauritania Party of the Democratic and Social Agreement 2013
Mauritania National Rally for Reform and Development 2013
Niger Party for People’s Dignity 1996
Niger Nigerien Alliance for Democracy and Progress 1996
Niger Social Democratic Rally 2009
Niger Rally for Democracy and Progress / National Union of Independents for Democratic Renewal 2009
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Nigeria All Nigeria People’s Party 1999
Panama National Liberal Party 1980
Panama Liberal Party 1984
Panama Republican Party 1984
Panama Labor and Agrarian Party 1984
Panama Labor and Agrarian Party 1989
Russia Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 1999
Russia Union of Right Forces 1999
Russia Fatherland – All Russia 1999
Russia Russian United Democratic Party ""Yabloko"" 1999
Russia Motherland – National Patriotic Union 2003
Russia Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 2003
Russia Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 2007
Russia Just Russia 2007
Russia Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 2011
Russia Just Russia 2011
Russia Just Russia 2016
Russia Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 2016
Rwanda Liberal Party 2003
Rwanda Social Democratic Party 2003
Rwanda Social Democratic Party 2008
Rwanda Liberal Party 2008
Rwanda Liberal Party 2013
Rwanda Social Democratic Party 2013
Senegal Senegalese Democratic Party 1988
Senegal Senegalese Democratic Party 1993
Serbia Serbian Radical Party 1992
Serbia Serbian Radical Party 1997
Sierra Leone Sierra Leone People’s Party 1977
Sierra Leone People’s Democratic Party 1996
Sierra Leone National Unity Party 1996
Sri Lanka Ceylon Workers’ Congress 1989
Sri Lanka Lanka Equal Society Party 2010
Sri Lanka Communist Party of Sri Lanka 2010
Sri Lanka Ceylon Workers’ Congress 2010
Sri Lanka Ceylon Workers’ Congress 2015
Tajikistan Communist Party of Tajikistan 1995
Tajikistan Communist Party of Tajikistan 2000
Tajikistan Communist Party of Tajikistan 2005
Tajikistan Agrarian Party 2015
Togo Action Committee for Renewal 2007
Togo Union of Forces for Change 2013
Turkey Nationalist Movement [Action] Party 2015
Turkmenistan Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs 2013
Turkmenistan Women’s Union of Turkmenistan 2013
Uganda Forum for Democratic Change 2006
Uganda Forum for Democratic Change 2011
Uganda Forum for Democratic Change 2016
Uzbekistan Progress Party of the Fatherland 1999
Uzbekistan People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan 1999
Uzbekistan People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan 2004
Uzbekistan Uzbekistan National Revival Democratic Party 2004
Uzbekistan Self-Sacrifice National Democratic Party 2004
Uzbekistan People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan 2009
Uzbekistan Uzbekistan National Revival Democratic Party 2009
Uzbekistan People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan 2014
Uzbekistan Justice Social Democratic Party 2014
Uzbekistan Uzbekistan National Revival Democratic Party 2014
Uzbekistan Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan 2014
Venezuela For Social Democracy 2005
Venezuela Fatherland for All 2005
Venezuela Fatherland for All 2010
Zimbabwe Movement for Democratic Change – Ncube 2008
Zimbabwe Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai 2008
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5 Varieties of Party Identity and Organization (V-Party)
expert survey questions
The expert survey is developed in a series of consultative meetings between 2017 and 2019
and tested in a pilot study in summer 2019. V-Party recruited around 665 country experts
to conduct the coding in January 2020. All expert responses were collected by the end of
April 2020. Each party-election-year observation is typically coded by at least 4 experts who
are specialized in party research. Experts respond to survey questions on ordinal five-point
likert scales. The V-Dem measurement model, a custom-made Baysesian item response
theory model, is used to convert expert responses from ordinal scores into interval scores
that capture the values of the observed latent phenomenon.
1. Local party branches (v2palocoff)
Question: Does this party maintain permanent offices that operate outside of election
campaigns at the local or municipal-level?
Clarification: By “local or municipal” we mean low level administrative divisions that
are ranked below regions, provinces, or states. We refer to offices that maintain pro-
fessional personnel and continued interaction of the party with citizens. Permanent
offices operate outside of election campaigns.
Responses:
0: The party does not have permanent local offices.
1: The party has permanent local offices in few municipalities.
2: The party has permanent local offices in some municipalities.
3: The party has permanent local offices in most municipalities.
4: The party has permanent local offices in all or almost all municipalities.
Cross–coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model.
2. Local Active Presence (v2paactcom)
Question: To what degree are party activists and personnel permanently active in local
communities?
Clarification: Please consider the degree to which party activists and personnel are
active both during election and non-election periods. Party personnel refers to paid
staff.
Responses:
0: There is negligible permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local
communities.
1: There is minor permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local com-
munities.
2: There is noticeable permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local
communities.
3: There is significant permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local
communities.
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4: There is widespread permanent presence of party activists and personnel in local
communities.
Cross–coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model.
3. Affiliate organizations (v2pasoctie)
Question: To what extent does this party maintain ties to prominent social organiza-
tions?
Clarification: When evaluating the strength of ties between the party and social orga-
nizations please consider the degree to which social organizations contribute to party
operations by providing material and personnel resources, propagating the party’s mes-
sage to its members and beyond, as well as by directly participating in the party’s
electoral campaign and/or mobilization efforts. Social organizations include: Religious
organizations (e.g. churches, sects, charities), trade unions/syndical organizations or
cooperatives, cultural and social associations (e.g. sports clubs, neighborhood asso-
ciations), political associations (e.g. environmental protection) and professional and
business associations. Social organizations do not include paramilitary units or militias.
Responses:
0: The party does not maintain ties to any prominent social organization.
1: The party maintains weak ties to prominent social organizations.
2: The party maintains moderate ties to prominent social organizations.
3: The party maintains strong ties to prominent social organizations.
4: The party controls prominent social organizations.
Cross–coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model.
4. Candidate nomination (v2panom)
Question: Which of the following options best describes the process by which the party
decides on candidates for the national legislative elections?
Clarification: If nomination procedures vary across constituencies consider the most
common practice.
Responses:
0: The party leader unilaterally decides on which candidates will run for the party in
national legislative elections.
1: The national party leadership (i.e. an executive committee) collectively decides
which candidates will run for the party in national legislative elections.
2: Delegates of local/regional organizations decide which candidates will run for the
party in national legislative elections.
3: All party members decide on which candidates will run for the party in national
legislative elections in primaries/caucuses.
4: All registered voters decide on which candidates will run for the party in national
legislative elections in primaries/caucuses.
Cross–coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model.
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5. Personalization of party (v2paind) - This variable is reversed to construct the
index.
Question: To what extent is this party a vehicle for the personal will and priorities of
one individual leader?
Responses:
0: The party is not focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual leader.
1: The party is occasionally focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual
party leader.
2: The party is somewhat focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual
party leader.
3: The party is mainly focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual
party leader.
4: The party is solely focused on the personal will and priorities of one individual party
leader.
Cross–coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model
6. Party support group (v2pagroup) (Options 5 and 12 were merged to construct
the dummy variable indicating ethnic-regional parties. A party is considered to ethnic-
regional or religious if more than half of the experts selected the relevant categories.)
Question: To which particular group in society does the core membership and sup-
porters of this party belong?
Clarification: Choose only the key groups. Though you may choose up to three groups,
if only one group is most relevant, please only choose that group.
Responses:
0: No specific, clearly identifiable group. (0=No, 1=Yes)
1: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. (0=No,
1=Yes)
2: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. (0=No, 1=Yes)
3: Business elites. (0=No, 1=Yes)
4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes)
5: An ethnic or racial group(s). (0=No, 1=Yes)
6: A religious group(s). (0=No, 1=Yes)
7: Local elites, including customary chiefs. (0=No, 1=Yes)
8: Urban working classes, including labor unions. (0=No, 1=Yes)
9: Urban middle classes. (0=No, 1=Yes)
10: Rural working classes (e.g. peasants). (0=No, 1=Yes)
11: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). (0=No, 1=Yes)
12: Regional groups or separatists. (0=No, 1=Yes)
13: Women. (0=No, 1=Yes)
14: Other specific groups. (0=No, 1=Yes)
7. Political pluralism (v2paplur)
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Question: Prior to this election, to what extent was the leadership of this political
party clearly committed to free and fair elections with multiple parties, freedom of
speech, media, assembly and association?
Clarification: Party leaders show no commitment to such principles if they openly sup-
port an autocratic form of government without elections or freedom of speech, assembly
and association (e.g. theocracy; single-party rule; revolutionary regime). Party leaders
show a full commitment to key democratic principles if they unambiguously support
freedom of speech, media, assembly and association and pledge to accept defeat in free
and fair elections.
Responses:
0: Not at all committed. The party leadership was not at all committed to free and
fair, multi-party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.
1: Not committed. The party leadership was not committed to free and fair, multi-
party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.
2: Weakly committed. The party leadership was weakly committed to free and fair,
multiparty elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.
3: Committed. The party leadership was committed to free and fair, multi-party elec-
tions, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.
4: Fully committed. The party leadership was fully committed to free and fair, multi-
party elections, freedom of speech, media, assembly and association.
Cross–coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model.
8. Economic left-right scale (v2pariglef) Question: Please locate the party in terms
of its overall ideological stance on economic issues.
Clarification: Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in
the economy. This includes higher taxes, more regulation and government spending
and a more generous welfare state. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced
economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less govern-









Cross–coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model.
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix of Organizational Features and Ideological Orientations
v2palocoff v2paactcom v2pasoctie v2panom v2paind v2paplur v2pariglef
(not reversed) (distance) (distance)
v2palocoff 1.00 0.74 0.55 0.22 -0.00 -0.04 -0.05
v2paactcom 0.74 1.00 0.67 0.34 -0.00 0.09 0.14
v2pasoctie 0.55 0.67 1.00 0.22 -0.12 0.07 0.02
v2panom 0.22 0.34 0.22 1.00 -0.44 0.28 0.14
v2paind (not reversed) -0.00 -0.00 -0.12 -0.44 1.00 -0.05 -0.10
v2paplur (distance) -0.04 0.09 0.07 0.28 -0.05 1.00 0.23
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Figure 1: Ideological orientations of opposition parties and ruling parties in electoral autocracies.




Table 2: Excluding pre-electoral coalitions (both formal and informal).
Model 1A Model 2A Model 3A Model 4A Model 5A Model 6A Model 7A
(0.42) (0.42) (0.32) (0.33) (2.82) (2.88) (2.82)
Organizational extensiveness −0.29∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Dispersion of decision-making authority −0.70∗∗∗ −0.58∗∗ −0.60∗∗∗ −0.64∗∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗ −0.55∗∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.28) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
Ideological distance −1.32∗∗∗ −1.16∗∗∗ −1.18∗∗∗ −1.20∗∗∗ −1.20∗∗∗ −1.19∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.28)
Previous co-optation (#) 0.96∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.27) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Ethnic-regional −0.10 −0.11 −0.12 −0.10
(0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.42)
Religious −0.83 −0.73 −0.80 −0.73
(0.68) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66)
Presidential 0.29 0.27 0.28
(0.64) (0.65) (0.64)
Electoral democracy −1.67 −1.54 −1.68
(1.51) (1.53) (1.51)
log Oil production pc 0.13 0.13 0.13
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
log GDP pc −0.69∗∗ −0.73∗∗ −0.69∗∗
(0.33) (0.34) (0.33)
Organizational extensiveness X −0.12
Ideological distance (0.09)
Dispersion of internal decision-making authority X 0.03
Ideological distance (0.25)
AIC 509.55 443.43 434.55 436.62 428.55 428.99 430.52
BIC 531.12 469.01 464.39 474.99 483.60 488.28 489.80
Log Likelihood −249.77 −215.71 −210.27 −209.31 −201.28 −200.50 −201.26
Num. obs. 553 525 525 525 510 510 510
Num. groups: party_id 317 301 301 301 297 297 297
Num. groups: country_id 64 63 63 63 62 62 62
Var: party_id (Intercept) 3.12 3.42 0.49 0.35 0.14 0.10 0.13
Var: country_id (Intercept) 7.54 6.41 3.53 3.50 3.04 3.31 3.03
Hierarchical logit models. Standard errors in parentheses. 71 formal and informal pre-electoral coalitions are excluded. ∗∗∗p < 0.01;
∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Controlling for opposition party seat share and party age.
Model 8A Model 9A Model 10A
Organizational extensiveness −0.24∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Dispersion of decision-making authority −0.57∗∗∗ −0.52∗∗ −0.58∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
Ideological distance −1.32∗∗∗ −1.30∗∗∗ −1.37∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.24) (0.28)
Previous co-optation (#) 1.27∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.30) (0.29)
Ethnic-regional 0.24 0.20 0.22
(0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
Religious −1.07∗ −1.19∗∗ −1.08∗
(0.60) (0.60) (0.60)
Presidential 0.27 0.28 0.28
(0.64) (0.65) (0.64)
Electoral democracy −1.54 −1.24 −1.51
(1.52) (1.53) (1.52)
log Oil production pc 0.14 0.14 0.14
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
log GDP pc −0.74∗∗ −0.77∗∗ −0.73∗∗
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
log Opposition party seat share 0.22 0.26 0.23
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
log Opposition party age −0.06 −0.08 −0.06
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Organizational extensiveness X −0.17∗
Ideological distance (0.09)
Dispersion of internal decision-making authority X −0.11
Ideological distance (0.25)
AIC 469.41 468.17 471.26
BIC 534.25 537.33 540.42
Log Likelihood −219.70 −218.09 −219.63
Num. obs. 557 557 557
Num. groups: party_id 308 308 308
Num. groups: country_id 62 62 62
Var: party_id (Intercept) 0.38 0.26 0.40
Var: country_id (Intercept) 3.09 3.48 3.12
Hierarchical logit models. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Controlling for additional country-level variables and region dummies.
Model 11A Model 12A Model 13A Model 14A Model 15A Model 16A
Organizational extensiveness −0.22∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Dispersion of decision-making authority −0.53∗∗∗ −0.48∗∗ −0.54∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
Ideological distance −1.34∗∗∗ −1.32∗∗∗ −1.39∗∗∗ −1.32∗∗∗ −1.30∗∗∗ −1.35∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.25) (0.28) (0.24) (0.24) (0.27)
Previous co-optation (#) 1.14∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28)
Ethnic-regional 0.33 0.30 0.32 0.26 0.24 0.25
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.42)
Religious −0.98 −1.09∗ −0.98 −1.18∗∗ −1.28∗∗ −1.18∗∗
(0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60)
Presidential 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.36 0.35 0.37
(0.65) (0.67) (0.65) (0.66) (0.68) (0.66)
Electoral democracy −1.04 −0.81 −1.01 −1.66 −1.42 −1.65
(1.87) (1.90) (1.88) (1.51) (1.53) (1.51)
log Oil production pc 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.09
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
log GDP pc −0.75∗∗ −0.79∗∗ −0.74∗∗ −0.83∗∗ −0.88∗∗ −0.83∗∗
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37)
V-Dem presidentialism index 1.13 1.28 1.13
(1.39) (1.41) (1.39)
V-Dem state ownership of economy 0.03 0.08 0.02
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.17 0.17 0.16
(1.16) (1.20) (1.16)
Incumbent seat share −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Organizational extensiveness X −0.17∗ −0.16∗
Ideological distance (0.10) (0.09)
Dispersion of internal decision-making authority X −0.10 −0.07
Ideological distance (0.25) (0.25)
Latin America and the Caribbean −1.87∗ −1.91∗ −1.87∗
(1.01) (1.05) (1.01)
The Middle East and Nother Africa 0.51 0.49 0.53
(1.39) (1.46) (1.39)
Sub-Saharan Africa −1.11 −1.25 −1.10
(0.83) (0.86) (0.83)
Asia and Pacific −1.81∗ −2.05∗ −1.81∗
(1.01) (1.06) (1.01)
AIC 472.84 471.54 474.72 467.13 466.08 469.09
BIC 546.32 549.35 552.52 540.61 543.89 546.90
Log Likelihood −219.42 −217.77 −219.36 −216.56 −215.04 −216.54
Num. obs. 557 557 557 557 557 557
Num. groups: party_id 308 308 308 308 308 308
Num. groups: country_id 62 62 62 62 62 62
Var: party_id (Intercept) 0.60 0.50 0.62 0.35 0.28 0.36
Var: country_id (Intercept) 2.72 3.06 2.73 2.89 3.24 2.90
Hierarchical logit models. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 5: Replication of Table 1 in the Main Text Using Multiple Imputation.
Model 17A Model 18A Model 19A Model 20A Model 21A Model 22A
Organizational extensiveness −0.31∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Dispersion of decision-making authority −0.70∗∗ −0.52∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗ −0.53∗∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.26) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Ideological distance −1.47∗∗∗ −1.33∗∗∗ −1.34∗∗∗ −1.35∗∗∗ −1.42∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.26)
Previous co-optation (#) 0.98∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26)
Ethnic-regional 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.10
(0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40)
Religious −1.25∗∗ −1.30∗∗ −1.47∗∗ −1.32∗∗
(0.60) (0.59) (0.59) (0.59)
Presidential 0.34 0.40 0.36
(0.62) (0.63) (0.62)
Electoral democracy −1.51 −1.42 −1.47
(1.45) (1.40) (1.45)
log Oil production pc 0.13 0.13 0.13
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
log GDP pc −0.64∗∗ −0.64∗∗ −0.63∗∗
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Organizational extensiveness X −0.15∗
Ideological distance (0.09)
Dispersion of internal decision-making authority X −0.15
Ideological distance (0.23)
AIC 564.38 526.66 515.43 516.21 514.53 517.79
BIC 586.40 553.08 555.06 573.46 571.78 579.44
Log Likelihood −277.19 −257.33 −248.71 −245.11 −244.27 −244.89
Num. obs. 604 604 604 604 604 604
Num. groups: party_id 328 328 328 328 328 328
Num. groups: country_id 64 64 64 64 64 64
Var: party_id (Intercept) 6.18 4.67 0.54 0.45 0.34 0.46
Var: country_id (Intercept) 9.53 6.22 3.35 3.02 3.45 3.05
Hierarchical logit models. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
51
